Gate Level Probabilistic Simulation Based Hardware Trojan Susceptibility Analysis of Combinational Circuits by Gurram, Venkata Lakshmi Bhargavi
University of South Florida 
Scholar Commons 
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 
October 2018 
Gate Level Probabilistic Simulation Based Hardware Trojan 
Susceptibility Analysis of Combinational Circuits 
Venkata Lakshmi Bhargavi Gurram 
University of South Florida, gurramv@mail.usf.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons 
Scholar Commons Citation 
Gurram, Venkata Lakshmi Bhargavi, "Gate Level Probabilistic Simulation Based Hardware Trojan 
Susceptibility Analysis of Combinational Circuits" (2018). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/8117 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. 
For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu. 
Gate Level Probabilistic Simulation Based Hardware Trojan Susceptibility Analysis of
Combinational Circuits
by
Venkata Lakshmi Bhargavi Gurram
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Computer Science
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
College of Engineering
University of South Florida
Major Professor: Srinivas Katkoori, Ph.D.
Robert Karam, Ph.D.
Hao Zheng, Ph.D.
Date of Approval:
October 19, 2018
Keywords: Logic Simulation, Hardware Security, Trojan Trigger, Very-Large-Scale-Integration
Copyright © 2018, Venkata Lakshmi Bhargavi Gurram
DEDICATION
I dedicate this work to my family and all my beloved ones who helped and supported me.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would first like to formally express my deep gratitude to Dr. Srinivas Katkoori for providing
the opportunity to work on this project. I always cherish his support and express my gratitude that
he has helped me identify my strengths and use them in a best possible way. I am forever grateful
to him for bringing me success with his guidance and constant support. I would like to thank my
parents, whose love and support are with me in whatever I pursue. I would like to thank Dr. Hao
Zheng and Dr. Robert Karam for spending their precious time to serve as members on my thesis
committee. I would like to thank Sheikh Ariful Islam for his assistance throughout this work. I
would like to thank God for shielding me to pursue a fruitful path. I would also like to thank my
friends and colleagues I have associated with for their help and assistance.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Thesis Motivation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Proposed Approach Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Experimental Results Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Thesis Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Hardware Trojans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Hardware Trojan Threat and Susceptibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 Measures to Avoid Hardware Trojan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.3 Time Estimation for Activation of Hardware Trojans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Probability Waveforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.1 Signal Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.2 Transition Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Simulation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Signal Dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
CHAPTER 3: PROPOSED APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1 VLSI Synthesis Design Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.1 Behavioral Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.2 RTL Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1.3 Logic Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1.4 Technology Mapping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1.5 Physical Design Tools. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
i
3.2 Proposed Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.1 Probabilistic Simulation Based Hardware Trojan Susceptibility Tool. . . . . 24
3.2.2 Illustrative Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.1 Experimental Flow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2 Probabilistic Simulation Execution Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
ii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1 Two Input AND Gate Forcing Set Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Table 4.1 MCNC Benchmark Circuits and the Netlist Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Table 4.2 Comparison of Execution Times and Speedup - 10K Test Vector Sequence . . . . . . . . 30
Table 4.3 Comparison of Execution Times and Speedup - 50K Test Vector Sequence . . . . . . . . 30
Table 4.4 Comparison of Execution Times and Speedup - 100K Test Vector Sequence . . . . . . . 31
iii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Components of a Hardware Trojan Horse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Figure 1.2 Combinational Hardware Trojan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 1.3 Sequential Hardware Trojan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Figure 2.1 Typical Structure of Hardware Trojans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 2.2 Design Process for Hardware Trojan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 2.3 Four Trigger Hardware Trojan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 2.4 Eight Trigger Hardware Trojan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 2.5 Prototype for Modeling Integrated Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Figure 2.6 Hardware Trojan Detection and Diagnosis Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Figure 2.7 MERO Approach for Detecting Rare Events (Trojan Insertions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Figure 2.8 A Probabilistic Waveform (Bottom) for Three Input Logical Waveforms (Top) . . . 15
Figure 3.1 VLSI Synthesis Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure 3.2 Proposed Hardware Trojan Susceptibility Analysis Tool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 3.3 Two Level Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 3.4 Probabilistic Waveforms on Primary Inputs G1 and G2 and Internal Line G5 . . . . 26
Figure 3.5 Probabilistic Waveforms on Primary Inputs G3 and G4 and Internal Line G6 . . . . 27
Figure 3.6 Probabilistic Waveforms on Internal Lines G5 and G6 and on Primary Output G7 27
Figure 4.1 Experimental Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
iv
ABSTRACT
Today multi-million gate integrated circuits are being commonly used in many critical (eg.,
health care) and sensitive (eg., military) applications. Therefore, they are susceptible to malicious
modifications, namely, Hardware Trojans (HTs), with the intent of leaking sensitive information,
denial-of-service etc. There are many ways of inserting Hardware Trojans in ICs. Thus, HT detection
and mitigation are very important tasks. In this thesis, we propose a novel probabilistic simulation
based approach to estimate the susceptibility of a combinational circuit to a HT. One of the common
ways is to simulate the netlist with typical input sequences and identifying low activity nets in the
design that could be exploited for Hardware Trojans. This approach has the drawback of excessive
simulation time. Probabilistic simulation is very efficient as the input sequences are condensed into
probabilistic waveforms which are then propagated through the netlist to identify low activity nets.
The main advantage of the proposed technique is rapid analysis of a netlist for HT susceptibility. We
experimented with eleven MCNC benchmarks and demonstrate significant speedup (approximately
2 x 103 to 5 x 103) over traditional simulation based approach.
v
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Identifying hardware trojans (HTs) in a circuit has become a huge challenge for the designers.
The conventional simulation approaches are not sufficient to address this problem effectively, as an
typical HT has a small footprint in the circuit and is designed such a way that it is rarely triggered.
In this thesis, we propose a new and promising approach that employs probabilistic simulation to
quickly analyze the susceptibility of a design to HTs designed with low activity nodes in the circuit.
1.1 Thesis Motivation
Figure 1.1: Components of a Hardware Trojan Horse
The changes made by antagonist/adversary to abuse the hardware system to achieve access
to the information or the design flow in the circuits are termed as Hardware Trojans [1]. A smart
antagonist conceals the manipulation of the integrated circuit. This makes it very hard to identify
1
Hardware Trojan during traditional testing phase of the system design. These adversaries will be
very careful to hide this behavior and thereby can be provoked only in unusual conditions of the
nodes. Therefore, these are very uncertain to be identified during traditional testing. Therefore,
there is a need to develop a faster technique to test the design that helps in consistent testing of
the system to avoid Hardware Trojan injection in the circuit.
Usually the Hardware Trojans are of two types [2], combinational and sequential. The combi-
national trojan circuit as shown in Figure 1.2 relies upon the existence of unusual states in different
nodes concurrently. Whereas in sequential trojan, prior to provoking a fault, a sequence of state
transfers occurs as shown in Figure 1.3.
Payload
Tn-1 Tn
T1
T2
Combinational
Trojan
Original Circuit
Figure 1.2: Combinational Hardware Trojan
1.2 Proposed Approach Overview
In this thesis, we propose a novel probabilistic simulation based approach to estimate the
susceptibility of a combinational circuit to a HT. One of the common ways is to simulate the netlist
2
PayloadTnT1 T2
Original Circuit
Tn-1
S1 S2 S3 Sn-1 Sn
Sequential Trojan Circuit
Figure 1.3: Sequential Hardware Trojan
with typical input sequences and identifying low activity nets in the design that could be exploited
for Hardware Trojans. This approach has the drawback of excessive simulation time. Probabilistic
simulation is very efficient as the input sequences are condensed into probabilistic waveforms which
are then propagated through the netlist to identify low activity nets. The main advantage of the
proposed technique is rapid analysis of a netlist for HT susceptibility.
1.3 Experimental Results Overview
We experimented with eleven (11) MCNC benchmark suite and demonstrate significant
speedup over traditional simulation based approach. The probabilistic simulation was implemented
in C. Three different lengths of random vector sequences are applied, namely, 10K, 50K, and 100K
and the average speed ups obtained are 5516, 4050, and 2277 respectively.
3
1.4 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the concepts of signal
and transition probabilities, simulation techniques, hardware trojans and various techniques used to
resist reverse engineering at different levels. Chapter 3 describes in detail the gate-level probabilistic
simulation to estimate hardware trojan susceptibility. Chapter 4 reports experimental results of the
proposed approach. Finally, Chapter 5 draws conclusions and outlines future directions.
1.5 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter, we introduced the concept of hardware trojan, its types, and the difficulty
of detecting them in circuits with traditional simulation. We gave an overview of the proposed
approach and the experimental results obtained.
4
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this Chapter, we analyse Hardware Trojans and review different methods for detection of
Hardware Trojans. We provide the background on probability waveforms and introduce probabilistic
simulation related terminology.
2.1 Hardware Trojans
In the recent times, security and protection of Integrated Circuits (ICs) has become a great
challenge because of obtaining the fabrication of IC’s from foundries that are unreliable. The IP
Cores designed in off-shore foundries and third party CAD tools have become threat to logical
design due to potential malicious functionality in them. This kind of malicious behavior in the
design is known as Hardware Trojan. These hardware Trojans are injected in the circuit to disturb
the normal functionality [3] of the circuits. A hardware trojan horse to be inserted in a logic circuit
has three components, Trigger, Driver, and Storage.
Trigger HT  circuit Payload
Hardware Trojan
Trigger Inputs Trojan Effect 
Figure 2.1: Typical Structure of Hardware Trojans
The Trigger in the design encourages the activities of a hardware Trojan horse by attaining
externally by using the stream of inputs or internally through a clock. The activities after existence
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of trigger are saved in a storage component externally or with a serial circuit [4] embedded internally
to a logical circuit. All these activities initialized by trigger are performed by the driver component.
Most of the time these Trojan activities [5] are not visible to ordinary users that connect with
the system. Therefore creating suitable test cases in order to identify hardware Trojans in the
circuit is more challenging because these hardware Trojans are fabricated to be provoked at unusual
constraints of the inputs to the circuit.
Figure 2.2: Design Process for Hardware Trojan
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 represents the Hardware Trojans having trigger conditions with four and
eight primary input nodes. The combinational circuit as in Fig. 2.3 activated only when its input
is “0101" and the combinational circuit as in Fig. 2.4 activated only when its input is “10011100."
Rare 1
Rare 0 
Rare 1
S
Rare 0 
G1
G2
G3
G4 S*
Figure 2.3: Four Trigger Hardware Trojan
2.1.1 Hardware Trojan Threat and Susceptibilities
The segment of circuit in addition with the original logic circuit used for harmful causes
is defined as a hardware Trojan. The figure 2.1 describes hardware Trojan. It carries payload,
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Rare 1
Rare 0 
Rare 1
S
Rare 0 
Rare 0 
Rare 1
Rare 1
Rare 0 
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6
G7
G8
S *
Figure 2.4: Eight Trigger Hardware Trojan
Hardware Trojan Circuit and a trigger. Usually these hardware Trojan circuits are maintained
to be calm for caching in the circuit and these are remained to be active when ever a particular
signal or event is triggered. Then the payload circuit applies the attacks [6] caused by hardware
Trojans in the circuit. These attacks cause undesirable effects such as sensitive data leakage, DoS
(Denial of Service). In real time, there are many hardware Trojan models that have varied actuation
procedures.
• Integrated Circuit commerce model: Five different parties are included in this Integrated Cir-
cuit model in its fabrication, design and flow of its implementation. Figure 2.5 depicts the
responsibilities shared between these parties through their interaction. Here SoC manufac-
turers fabricates and designs enterprise merchandise that has different Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses. The central components such as DSP cores, memory storage, etc., for IC’s are pro-
vided by IP vendors and foundries combines with these Soc manufacturers to design Integrated
Circuits (ICs). The EDA used by Soc manufacturers and IP suppliers to assist the modeling
of extensive IC’s are provided by EDA vendors. Finally, the institutions or individual persons
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that leverage merchandise from SoC manufacturers are the end users of Integrated Circuits.
Normally all the parties involved here provide their machinery and design to all other parties
in this commerce model. In particular, the SoC manufacturers contain links with all the other
parties in the Integrated circuit commerce model.
Figure 2.5: Prototype for Modeling Integrated Circuit
• Hardware Trojan threats in Integrated Circuit model: The issues caused by Hardware Trojans
during the communication among different parties in IC commerce model are discussed here.
There is no assurance that Hardware trojan will not be placed in circuit by foundries while
manufacturing IC’s during the interaction between the SoC manufacturers and foundries.
These hardware Trojans can be inserted by any malicious workers or the hackers from other
third parties consciously or unknowingly. These can also be injected during the interaction
between IP suppliers and SoC designs or IP suppliers and EDA traders. These are many
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chances of various categories of hardware Trojan injection into these stages. This can be
achieved in IP suppliers and SoC manufacturers by the suspicious individual in the IP providers
team. It it very simple for adversaries in the team to exploit RTL (Register Transfer Level)
and perform malign activities like modifying the arrangement in the chip, injecting harmful
codes etc. These adversaries hide these activities during fabrication and there by it will be
hard for anyone to suspect these in future.
• Hidden channels: The drivers of Hardware Trojan circuits are hidden from the end users.
These Hidden (Covert) Channels are designed to be placed into the resultant path of a changed
circuit in order to get the confidential information. The general method to execute these
hidden channels is to change the specific features of a commonly shared path in a more
unusual way. By employing such changes through hidden channels, the data is received by
the adversary by not letting the modification noticed by anyone.
2.1.2 Measures to Avoid Hardware Trojan
Here we discuss various steps involved to assist for the risks caused by Hardware Trojans
as we mentioned. Figure 2.6 delineated three steps involved in Hardware Trojan identification and
prevention. The principal steps involved are the Trojan Detection, diagnosis and Prevention of
Hardware Trojans. Hardware Trojan Detection method identifies whether there is any Hardware
Trojan present in the circuit or not and the Diagnosis phase decides the actual position where the
Hardware Trojan is present. This helps in eliminating the Hardware Trojans from the circuit or
dissembles them from the logical circuit. The prevention phase encourages to use techniques to
avoid Hardware Trojans at the initial stages of design of the logical circuits.
9
start
Satisfied
Segementation
Hardware Trojan
detection and diagnosis 
Post-processing and
Validation 
Figure 2.6: Hardware Trojan Detection and Diagnosis Flow
1. Hardware Trojan Detection: Detecting Hardware Trojans in modern circuits is really a big
challenge where Integrated Circuit permits are misused by the adversaries through low-level
procedures. Though there are different approaches to overcome this problem by helping the
end users. The detection procedures of hardware Trojans are classified into two fundamental
categories:
• Destructive Method: Here, the manipulations are detected by injecting micro pho-
tographs of levels of chip through de-metallizing all these levels in a fabricated Integrated
Circuit (IC). But this technique works by believing that there is a malicious attack for a
small amount of arbitrary fragments in the scope of fabrication. The choice of perfectly
fabricated Integrated Circuit design is the way to recognize the Trojans. But the main
drawback of this kind of approach is more costly in scope of time and price. Verifying a
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single Integrated Circuit also takes months. Therefore it became important to examine
non-destructive techniques for identifying the Trojans.
• Non-destructive Method: Generally these non-destructive methods [7] are mainly classi-
fied into two categories.
a. Logical test case: This logical testing in contrast with the Side-Channel Evaluation are
completely dependent on changes in processes and noise impacts. The complex problem in this
kind of test is an opponent can use an excessive amount of Trojans. Therefore, logical testing
can detect few Trojans in order to solve the problems comparably. The design approach for
identifying the infused Trojans in the circuit by logical testing can be achieved by inserting
a significant circuitry in the Integrated Circuit. Though the circuits that does not have this
kind of design pattern can not be used for identifying the Trojans in the circuit.
b. Side-Channel Evaluation: Where as in Side-Channel Evaluation it is concerned more about
the changes caused in architectural pattern or substantial components like passage obstruction,
power consumption in Integrated Circuit model. We can notice the variations in waveforms
at primary outputs rather than eliciting at malicious actions. In contrast with all the other
side-channel analysis techniques, hardware Trojan detection [8] can be attained better by
using path delay method. Where each path in the circuit are different and independent
with each other, the delay in the passage can be measured computed distinctly. But the
drawback of this kind of technique is that we can observe huge malicious alterations whereas
tiny Trojan insertions can not be determined using side-channel analysis. The high-level flow
chart of MERO approach to identify Hardware Trojans is described in Figure 2.7. This figure
illustrates the identification of unusual events and its evaluation using test-cases.
11
Input:  Number of
Trojans, random
patterns, circuit netlist
Trojan Selection
Generate optimized patterns
END
MERO
Figure 2.7: MERO Approach for Detecting Rare Events (Trojan Insertions)
2. Hardware Trojan Diagnosis: There are many different Hardware Trojan detection techniques
available today. But the particular data regarding the hardware Trojans like the category and
region of Hardware Trojans and also the triggers of Hardware Trojans are needed by the SoC
manufacturers or the IP suppliers that helps in discarding the Hardware Trojans from the
logical circuits.
Here we discuss the techniques that are used for diagnosing Hardware Trojans. This kind of
diagnosis technique is dependent of GLC (Gate Level Characterization) and analysis, segmen-
tation of the circuit. Hardware Trojan Segmentation or analysis, Hardware Trojan Detection,
and Hardware Trojan Diagnosis are the three main stages involved in this method as depicted.
The representation of analysis is designed to be first prepared by the ratios of association, con-
trollability and also by the precision of Gate Level Characterization. Then, the next step is
to partition the large logical circuit into smaller circuits. Then, it is simpler for detection and
diagnosis of Hardware Trojans in these smaller sub-circuits. The analytical logic is imple-
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mented here as the next step in this procedure. All the steps in this system can be iterated
as many number of times as required.
The hardware Trojan diagnosis can also be done using another procedure that is more fo-
cused on the detailed examination of uniformity, regularity and segmentation of features, and
properties at gate-level. By using this approach, by calculating the properties at gate-level
anyone can detect the Hardware Trojans with converging gates. The leakage of capacity can
be revealed in these gates. Here, another fragment is initiated to specify the location of the
Hardware Trojan.
3. Hardware Trojan Prevention: Though the procedures discussed in the above sections- detec-
tion and diagnosis of Hardware Trojans are favorable, they have some problems that includes
the recognition of the infrequent node, the fluctuations in the process flow and the divergence
of the computations. So, in order to upgrade these procedure for increasing their advantages, it
is important to manufacture the Integrated Circuits that maintain self-defense. Today Trojan
prevention is introduced in many models such as design or layout-filler, obfuscation, dummy
inclusions in logical circuits and split fabrication.
BISA (Built in Self Authentication) model can also be used for Hardware Trojan prevention
by prohibiting the inclusion of auxiliary Trojan gates into the design of logical circuit. The
method of Layout filling assists the prevention of Hardware Trojan by minimizing the prob-
ability of malicious inclusions in the circuit by occupying the free space in the circuit with
some useful logic. The other way is recognizing the extra stock at the level of design inside the
device. We can also achieve prevention of Hardware Trojans by the model that multiplies the
infrequent node transition probabilities by placing duplicate flip-flops in the logical circuit.
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The nodes that has transition probability below the threshold value are recognized initially.
Then after the duplicate flip-flops are included to raise the probabilities of transition for the
nodes.
2.1.3 Time Estimation for Activation of Hardware Trojans
Prior data regarding the category of the Trojans or the site of the Trojan in the circuit
for that helps in authenticating are not available. Therefore, it is important to examine either
the full activation time or partial activation time [9] of Trojans. The Trojans full activation time
is indicated as the design pattern that affects the output of a logical circuit and that produces
glitches by initiating Trojans. Whereas the partial activation is indicated by inducing one or more
transitions in the logical Trojan circuit, by which we can enhance the efficacy of the methodologies.
The Trojan constitutes Trigger and payload.
These Trojans are initiated under specific circumstances, there by an error is infused by the
payload. The transitions occur in a logical circuit are dependent on its previous nodes. These
transitions are established through the primary inputs. Generally a Trojan contains many gates,
but here we consider only one Trojan gate. Logical circuit that is coupled with Trojan gate inputs
is defined as a Trojan cone. The time needed to produce transitions in gate of a Trojan is regulated
by this Trojan cone by determining the Trojan cone shape, the type of gate and number of gates.
2.2 Probability Waveforms
When two input vectors are considered during varied time intervals, then logic quantity for
every gate may be varied for each time interval based on the factor of signal propagating paths from
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initial inputs of the circuit to that particular gate. This results in the possibility for generation of
huge number of discrete output waveforms at each logic gate.
The methodology of waveform probabilities extracts the input stream provided by the user
along with the circuit to a specific gate in order to generate the output of the gate by considering
assigned probabilities for the circuit inputs. Probability waveform representation is exhibited in
the following diagram. The CREST methodology uses probability waveforms to denote the random
action at each node.
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Figure 2.8: A Probabilistic Waveform (Bottom) for Three Input Logical Waveforms (Top)
Therefore, the Probability Waveforms [10] designated by the probabilistic computations along
with the logical waveforms of every gate in the circuit. These probabilistic waveforms are the series of
the transition events (or edges) for a particular time frame, where occurrence probability represents
the events of the circuit. Each probabilistic waveform is combined with both signal probability and
transition probabilities obtained by a series of transition events or edges. This waveform will known
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to be as simple logic waveform when the signal probability and transition probability are defined
with 1’s and 0’s. Therefore every probability waveform ’w’ has two quantities: a) Signal Probability
b) Transition Probability
2.2.1 Signal Probability
The probability assigned to a logic signal at input gate-level is defined as a signal probability
[11]. Every input node will be assigned with some probability value that specifies the maximum
occurrence of the event at that node.
• Case1: The logic signal probability for signal A can be stated as (n= Probability of N=1)
• Case2: The signal probability when N=0 is stated as P(n=0)=1-(Probability of N=1)=1-n
Here, we consider the upper case letters as the names of the logic signals and the lower case
letters indicates the probabilities with respect to the logical signals.
2.2.2 Transition Probability
The probability of transition in logic signal by a node n during the time interval t is defined
as a transition probability. The transitions in logic signals can be either upward or downward. If
there is transition in probabilities from logic zero to logic one, which is known as upward transition
probability tun(t) and the change of transition probability from logic one to logic zero is known as
downward probability tdn(t). The upward transition probability an also be called as rising transition
probability and the downward transition probability is defined as falling transition probability.
The transition probability location in a logical waveform is also called as transition edge,
where this transition edge plays a crucial role in probability waveforms as it generates values through
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Table 2.1: Two Input AND Gate Forcing Set Table
Output Tags Input Tags
00 (00,00), (00,01), (00,10), (00,11), (01,00), (01,10), (10,00), (10,01), (11,00)
01 (01,01), (01,11), (11,01)
11 (11,11)
10 (10,10), (10,11), (11,10)
the circuit. These transition edges are known as events or also probabilistic events. Three different
probabilities are depicted by each and every event at a node X in a logical circuit:
• PX,h(t−)
• PX,lh(t)
• PX,h(t+)
These statistics help in calculating probabilities at other nodes in the circuit. For example,
at node X, ability of high to low transition can directly be derived from the probabilistic identity:
PX,h(t+)− PX,h(t+) = PX,lh(t)− PX,hl(t)
2.3 Simulation Algorithm
The simulation algorithm CREST is used to disseminate the initial inputs described by the
user into the circuit to obtain the predicted current waveform. This algorithm focuses and works
on probabilities and does not consider the logical signals. Therefore, it is a probabilistic simulation
algorithm and more deterministic itself. The strategy of integrating joint tagged waveforms is
represented in Table 2.1. The state values of every input of the gate can be used to anticipate the
values at the corresponding output of the gate.
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The inputs of probability waveforms can be produced in two different ways. Entering the
inputs as a series of absolute numbers in the range between 0 and 1 to the waveforms is one way. In
a different way the former simulations logic [12] for that design is considered in a way to generate
the inputs. Probability waveforms equivalent to these inputs can be acquired by considering the
average of all the possible logical waveform values for each node and this final value should be
ranged between 0 and 1. If there is no variation in signal at the input node, then the acquired value
at that node is considered as the essential value of the probability waveform for that time interval.
If there is a variation in the signal from high to low or from low to high, then the fraction that is
considered by the logic waveforms for the transition at that time is considered as the essential value
of the probability waveform for that node at that time interval.
The event handling simulation approach is utilized to propagate the given input waveform
probabilities throughout the circuit. Splitting the circuit into gates and considering the occurrence
of the event and estimating the current pulse caused by the event on each input to a gate and
thereby calculating the appropriate probability at the gate output. Finally, the waveform at the
output of the circuit can be generated by considering all the estimated streams from discrete gates
are accounted.
2.4 Signal Dependence
Recording the dependence or correlation of the probability values is a big challenge in these
kind of tools like CREST. So, the correlation in a circuit is divided into two various types in CREST
model. They are:
1. Temporal Dependence: The correlation among the values of a corresponding node of a circuit.
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2. Spatial Dependence: The correlation among the signals of the nodes that rely on equivalent
fan-out path in the logical circuit.
Most commonly, the dependence among the signals can be both or either of these correlations.
The restriction for calculations of temporal dependence by CREST is by considering the correlation
among the the signal transition edge that discrete two signal edge values. So, this is the main cause
for the introduction of the transition probabilities. So, to account the temporal correlations among
two nodes at a waveform is same as that of the full delineation of both the random process. So
keeping track of these temporal correlations can be more expensive.
Here, we consider that the inputs to the gates of a logical circuit are independent with each
other. This can be contradicted when there are re-convergent fan outs in the logical circuit. So in
order to control this situation we use the idea of supergates [13]. The segment of a logical circuit
that contains independent inputs is known as a Supergate. The input waveform stream that has re-
convergent fanout is known as re-convergent fanout inputs(RFI) for the nodes in the logical circuit.
All the inputs to the nodes of the circuit are independent and the propagation through the circuit
would become simple when logical circuits are allocated to the input nodes.
The notion of a supergate controls the spatial correlations. By diminishing this super gate, we
can achieve propagation through the gates with the help of independent inputs gate solver, that has
independent inputs to the gates. This gate can be propagated with the strategy of first evaluating
the gate that has its inputs with particular events to generate the equivalent output. This way of
producing the outputs by considering the corresponding input events is easy and fast. To do this
we need to take some part p of the gate and then generate a graph. Then the gate probabilities of
the transistor describes the edges of the generated graph.
19
2.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, various traditional approaches for hardware Trojan susceptibility that are
being used in Integrated circuits are discussed. We presented in detail the concept of probabilistic
simulation.
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CHAPTER 3: PROPOSED APPROACH
In this Chapter, we describe the proposed approach for detecting Hardware Trojans by
probabilistic simulation that uses gate-level probability waveforms. This process determines the gate
delays in the circuits by considering signal and transition probabilities [13]. The implementation
and principal features of proposed approach is explained here.
3.1 VLSI Synthesis Design Flow
Currently, as many electronic designs are using Very Large Scale Integrated (VLSI) circuits
that has millions of transistors and their interconnections inside a little area. So in order to manage
the complexity of circuits we follow the hierarchy illustrated in Figure 3.1. The different levels in
this VLSI synthesis design flow hierarchy are explained as follows.
3.1.1 Behavioral Specification
This level describes the design of actual performance by not considering the precise time
frame. The specification of this behavioral level can be assisted by various programming languages.
We have implemented behavioral model for the simulator using C programming, as the simulation is
faster using C by proving excellent domain for programming. Then this behavioral model has to be
developed to an register-transfer level (RTL) model to implement finally as an Integrated Circuit.
21
Figure 3.1: VLSI Synthesis Flow
3.1.2 RTL Description
The micro architecture of the circuit is depicted by the Register-transfer-level (RTL) [14]. We
use Verilog hardware design language for explaining the register-transfer-level in our model. Here,
the performance is measured by considering the functional unit transformation such as register files
and arithmetic-logic units in the sequential circuit happening concurrently.
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3.1.3 Logic Optimization
This level is responsible for transforming to nearer optimal performance from gate-level de-
scription obtained from RTL, focused in optimizing the space and rate of the implementation. There
are two ways for implementing logic optimization. It can be two level or multi level logic optimiza-
tion. The two level logic optimization applied as well organized programmable logic array (PLA)
for simpler logic synthesis. Whereas in multi level logic optimization we use the transformation for
boolean and algebra by producing more efficient circuits.
3.1.4 Technology Mapping
As the optimized logic net list is produced at gate-level the following step is Technology
mapping, where we effectively maps obtained logic net list to a semiconductor library consisting of
multiple gates from the trader. This level reviews the most of the difficulties encountered in logical
optimization at high level.
3.1.5 Physical Design Tools
Here we use several physical designer tools like module generators to produce the final layout
by making use of programming and layout languages. This tool also implements the data path for
high level performance of ICs. These physical design tools helps in generating prominent circuits
with high quality.
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Figure 3.2: Proposed Hardware Trojan Susceptibility Analysis Tool
3.2 Proposed Framework
3.2.1 Probabilistic Simulation Based Hardware Trojan Susceptibility Tool
The actual procedure that we have followed in developing the proposed Hardware Trojan
Susceptibility tool is shown in Figure 3.2. The procedure is explained in detail as follows:
1. The gate-level circuit in verilog format and sequence of inputs are given to the Hardware
Trojan Susceptibility tool.
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2. Then the input sequences are condensed into probabilistic waveforms. The waveform calcula-
tion varies depending on the type of gate. For example formulas for AND and OR as follows.
AND gate:
Signal probability:
Pes(t+) = Pw1,1(t+) + Pw2,1(t+) (A1)
Transition probability:
Pet,01(t) = Pw1,01(t)Pw2,1(t+) + Pw2,01(t)Pw1,1(t+) − Pw1,01(t)Pw2,01(t) (A2)
OR gate:
Signal probability:
Pet(t+) = Pw1,1(t+) + Pw2,1(t+) − Pw1,1(t+)Pw2,1(t+) (A1)
Transition probability:
Pes,01(t) = Pw1,1(t−)Pw2,01(t) + Pw2,1(t−)Pw1,01(t) − Pw1,01(t) (A2)
3. The probabilistic information (P) at circuit-level are obtained.
4. We set a threshold value (T). The Hardware Trojan in the netlist is triggered when its prob-
abilistic information value ’P’ is less than the trigger threshold value (T).
5. Then all the nets that satisfies Step 5 are notified by the tool.
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The obtained nets from Step 6 has high possibility of Hardware Trojans. This helps in
detecting the existence of Hardware trojans in the circuit and also diagnosis the exact location
where HTs may occur. Therefore, obtaining all this information before designing the final product
or prior to selling helps in preventing Hardware Trojans in the commercial products and improves
the trustworthiness of Integrated circuits.
3.2.2 Illustrative Example
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Figure 3.3: Two Level Circuit
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Figure 3.4: Probabilistic Waveforms on Primary Inputs G1 and G2 and Internal Line G5
When we pass input waveforms into each gate of a 2-level AND circuit as shown in Figure
3.1, the probabilistic waveforms can be computed by using formulas (A1) and (A2) shown above.
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Figure 3.6: Probabilistic Waveforms on Internal Lines G5 and G6 and on Primary Output G7
In order to achieve this, we need to pass the circuit through the proposed synthesis tool as shown
Figure 3.2. The outputs generated from the tool gives data related to probabilistic waveforms that
helps in determining the occurrence possibility of Hardware Trojans in the circuit at each net.
However we have compared the data generated from tool with that of actual values. The results
are exactly the same. This test proves the accuracy and speedup of the proposed tool.
3.3 Chapter Summary
We have demonstrated proposed approach in detail. The primary steps involved in the
process flow of the proposed susceptibility tool are analyzed and explained with an example. Most
of the techniques we represented in the literature has the drawback of excessive simulation time.
This proposed approach is very efficient and overcome this problem as the input sequences are
condensed into probabilistic waveforms which are then propagated through the net-list to identify
low activity nets.
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CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this chapter, we demonstrate actual flow of our proposed approach for Hardware Trojan
Detection and we report the experimental results performed on various benchmark circuits.
4.1 Experimental Flow
abc
Susceptibility
Analysis Tool
BLIF file
Susceptibility
nets
Gate library 
(and, or, nand, not,
xor, xnor) 
Mapped Netlist
Figure 4.1: Experimental Flow
To perform probabilistic simulation, we need to follow the flow as shown in Figure 4.1. The
first step is to generate the mapped Verilog net list from ABC synthesis tool by using corresponding
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Table 4.1: MCNC Benchmark Circuits and the Netlist Data
Benchmark No. of No. of Nets Gates
Primary Inputs Primary Outputs
c17 5 2 4 6
c432 36 7 157 164
c499 41 32 179 211
c880 60 26 260 286
c1355 41 32 179 211
c1908 33 25 240 265
c2670 233 140 513 653
c3540 50 22 937 959
c5315 178 123 1306 1429
c6288 32 32 1407 1439
c7552 207 108 1369 1477
BLIF file. In the next step, we pass the generated net lists through our proposed Susceptibility
Analysis Tool in order to generate the susceptibility nets by producing information regarding the
mapped netlist, which thereby helps in identifying Hardware Trojans in the circuits.
4.2 Probabilistic Simulation Execution Times
Table 4.1 shows eleven benchmark models that represents number of primary input nodes,
number of primary output nodes, number of nets and number of actual gates present in the verilog
netlist. Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 report the simulation times for eleven MCNC benchmarks for 10K,
50K and 100K input vector streams by comparing the results of proposed probabilistic simulations
with that of conventional simulation.
4.3 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter, we reported results for eleven (11) MCNC benchmarks. Compared to con-
ventional simulation, the probabilistic simulation approach can provide a speedup of up to 5000x.
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Table 4.2: Comparison of Execution Times and Speedup - 10K Test Vector Sequence
Conventional Simulation (sec) Probabilistic Simulation (sec) Speedup
Benchmark real user sys user + sys real user sys user + sys T1/T2
T1 T2
c17 42.49 6.87 29.94 36.81 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 36811
c432 44.39 7.88 31.67 39.55 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.008 4943.75
c499 37.28 7.49 29.12 36.61 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.008 4576.25
c880 38.05 8.04 29.26 37.30 0.017 0.010 0.006 0.016 2331.25
c1355 39.19 7.70 30.88 38.58 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.008 4822.50
c1908 37.01 7.50 28.75 36.25 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.010 3625
c2670 40.05 9.65 29.48 39.13 0.033 0.029 0.004 0.033 1185.76
c3540 42.45 9.38 32.31 41.69 0.054 0.045 0.008 0.053 786.60
c5315 40.81 9.87 29.51 39.38 0.084 0.076 0.007 0.083 474.46
c6288 39.40 9.12 29.40 38.52 0.067 0.064 0.002 0.066 583.64
c7552 43.64 10.96 31.94 42.90 0.082 0.068 0.012 0.080 536.25
Average 40.43 8.59 30.21 38.79 0.033 0.029 0.004 0.033 5516.04
Table 4.3: Comparison of Execution Times and Speedup - 50K Test Vector Sequence
Conventional Simulation (sec) Probabilistic Simulation (sec) Speedup
Benchmark real user sys user + sys real user sys user + sys T1/T2
T1 T2
c17 209.42 6.94 29.94 36.87 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 36875
c432 209.71 7.83 29.15 36.98 0.031 0.027 0.003 0.003 1232.67
c499 210.00 7.93 29.18 37.11 0.026 0.024 0.001 0.025 1484.40
c880 214.36 14.69 30.13 44.82 0.061 0.052 0.008 0.060 747
c1355 203.61 8.09 29.46 37.55 0.025 0.024 0.001 0.025 1502
c1908 206.75 11.61 30.36 41.97 0.038 0.036 0.001 0.037 1134.32
c2670 217.93 13.58 30.76 44.34 0.112 0.095 0.016 0.111 399.47
c3540 228.36 24.64 30.36 55.00 0.173 0.148 0.024 0.172 319.77
c5315 216.64 17.99 30.14 48.13 0.256 0.221 0.034 0.255 188.75
c6288 275.14 70.03 31.15 101.18 0.204 0.196 0.009 0.205 493.56
c7552 215.71 12.61 29.73 42.34 0.237 0.205 0.032 0.237 178.65
Average 218.88 17.81 30.03 47.84 0.105 0.093 0.012 0.103 4050.51
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Table 4.4: Comparison of Execution Times and Speedup - 100K Test Vector Sequence
Conventional Simulation (sec) Probabilistic Simulation (sec) Speedup
Benchmark real user sys user + sys real user sys user + sys T1/T2
T1 T2
c17 205.49 8.88 31.81 40.69 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.002 20345
c432 213.39 16.08 31.49 47.57 0.060 0.052 0.007 0.059 806.27
c499 217.32 17.30 31.23 48.53 0.050 0.049 0.000 0.049 990.41
c880 229.17 22.67 30.88 53.55 0.123 0.097 0.026 0.123 435.37
c1355 212.13 8.93 29.97 38.9 0.051 0.050 0.001 0.051 762.75
c1908 210.32 16.06 31.19 47.25 0.076 0.074 0.002 0.076 621.71
c2670 219.09 18.96 29.76 48.72 0.217 0.184 0.033 0.217 224.53
c3540 243.64 42.78 31.97 74.75 0.336 0.276 0.060 0.336 222.47
c5315 233.86 28.57 31.49 60.06 0.469 0.413 0.055 0.468 128.33
c6288 346.81 138.7 33.92 172.62 0.392 0.374 0.017 0.391 441.48
c7552 220.77 17.36 17.36 34.72 0.466 0.408 0.057 0.465 74.67
Average 231.99 30.57 30.09 60.66 0.204 0.180 0.023 0.203 2277.54
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
We have proposed a tool to estimate the Hardware Trojan susceptibility at gate level in
combinational circuits. Our proposed approach is more time efficient and can be used to apply
rapidly for improving the security of Integrated circuits. This approach is a systematic way in
which we can deal with complex circuits. We have verified proposed tool with eleven benchmark
circuits.
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